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The dispute between scientific realism and anti-realism is one of the most exciting topics in the current general philosophy of science. In the debate, the anti-realists attack their opponents with two 
main arguments, the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of 
theories by all possible data. The realists, on the other hand, defend their 
position through the famous no miracle argument, which seems to be their 
most important standpoint.
Scientific realism1 has been the subject of various characterizations 
throughout this struggle (see, for example, van Fraassen 8, Kukla 3–4, 
Carman 43–6, Diéguez Lucena 252–253). We could summarize this 
position in the following four theses:
1. There is a world independent of the human
mind, which is spatial and temporal.
2. This world is cognizable. 
1 I am referring to traditional scientific realism. I will not discuss the structural variants of realism 
in this paper.
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3. The best scientific theories are such that their
theoretical terms refer.
4. These theories are true or approximately true.
In this paper, I will expose two reconstructions of the no miracle 
argument and will make a criticism of it, so that the realistic approach will 
be seriously questioned.
§1 - Posing the problem
First of all, I would like to clarify that I adhere to an anti-realist 
position. I think, as I tried to show elsewhere (Thiry), that there are no 
good reasons to ensure that our best theories satisfy theses 3 and 4.2 But 
then a series of questions arise, namely, How do we explain the success 
of science? How is it that with false theories it is possible to account for 
the phenomena observed or produced and from them create advanced 
technology? We could pose the following dilemma: Is it by miracle that 
we can formulate successful (yet false) theories or is there no choice but to 
embrace scientific realism and consider that our best theories are true or 
that they approach the truth? I will try to show that it is not necessary to 
opt for either of the two horns of this dilemma, i.e., I will try to show how it 
is possible that certain theories, although false, can be successful and also, 
that their success is not miraculous.
This approach leads us to consider one of the best arguments of the 
realists, specifically, the already mentioned no miracle argument. One 
of its formulations was given by Putnam (1975). For this philosopher, 
realism “is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a 
miracle” (Putnam 73). Thus, a way to reconstruct the argument would be 
the following:
(P1) If the best theories are not true or approxi-
mately true then their success is due to a 
miracle.
(P2) Miracles do not exist.
(C) The best theories are true or approximately true.
It is clear that this is valid reasoning since it is a case of Modus 
Tollens. To avoid the conclusion, my goal will be to show in paragraph 
three that P1 is false, i.e., I will show an example of a theory that is neither 
2 To be honest, I also have serious doubts about 1 and 2. However, I will not analyze these points 
in this work.
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true nor approximately true and yet it is not due to a miracle that it has 
been successful, but its success is due to other reasons that I will develop 
later. That way, I will reject the two horns of the previously formulated 
dilemma by proposing a third way. Before I do, I will present my point of 
view using a thought experiment.
§2 - A thought experiment3
Let us suppose that some magnitude y depends on another magnitude 
x according to the equation y = ex (where ‘e’ is Euler’s number, which is 
irrational and is approximately equal to 2.71828182). Let us also admit that 
scientists do not know that y depends on x in this way. Let us also suppose 
that in a certain period the two magnitudes (x, y) have been measured with 
their respective measurement errors and that the following data has been 
obtained:
x
1
 = 0 ± 0.1;  y
1
 = 1 ± 0.3
x
2
 = 0.25 ± 0.1; y
2
 = 1.28 ± 0.4
x
3
 = 0.5 ± 0.1;  y
3
 = 1.64 ± 0.6
At that time, researchers proposed some theory, with their respective 
principles, unobservable entities, etc., deducting from this theory that the 
formula that gives the dependency of y respect to x is:
(I) y = 1 + x + x2 / 2
This formula is in accordance with the experimental data, taking into 
account measurement errors, since if we replace x by 0 in the formula (I), 
we obtain y = 1, in accordance with the measured data; if x = 0.25, we get 
from (I) y = 1.28125, also according to the measurement, and finally, if 
x = 0.5, we obtain y = 1.625, also in the line with the empirical data.
Let us now consider that the scientists who work on this theory 
decide to make some novel predictions:
(II) If x = 1, then y = 2.5
(III) If x = 1.5, then y = 3.625
Imagine that one hundred years pass before it is possible to ex-
perimentally reach the corresponding values of x. After that period, the 
pertinent measurements are made and the following data is obtained:
3 The article by Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2011) contains a highly technical exposition with some 
ideas similar to the ones developed here.
AlejAndro Victor thiry4
(IV) x
4
 = 1 ± 0.3; y
4
 = 2.71 ± 0.4
(V) x
5
 = 1.5 ± 0.2; y
5
 = 4.48 ± 0.9
It is clear the predictions (II) and (III) agree with the measurements 
(IV) and (V). Suppose now that researchers continue obtaining novel and 
successful predictions for another hundred years. What would a scientific 
realist say after this? That our theory has made novel predictions and that, 
as these have been confirmed experimentally, we must conclude that our 
theory is approximately true and that its theoretical terms refer. It would 
be very strange, a realist would think, that for two hundred years we have 
been able to make successful predictions with our theory and that it was 
completely false and that we have found it by pure miracle.
But note that for higher values of x, the differences between the value 
given by ex and formula (I) are increasing. So for example, if x = 10, e10 is 
approximately equal to 22026, but equation (I) gives: y = 61; if x = 20, we 
obtain as an approximate value of e20 the number 485,165,195, but (I) gives 
the value 221; and so on for larger values of x. Thus, when those values of 
x can be reached experimentally, the measurements of the variables (x, y) 
will differ from the predictions made by the formula (I), and the theory in 
question will no longer successfully pass the empirical tests.
What is the moral of all this? We can formulate theories that fit the 
experimental data obtained previously, that make novel predictions, that 
these predictions are confirmed . . . and yet the theory can be false. But how 
is it possible that a theory makes successful novel predictions and that it is 
false? The point is that the first predictions of the theory of the example 
were within the range in which the numerical values of the formula (I) were 
similar to the numerical values of the supposed true equation y = ex, and for 
this reason the predictions were fulfilled. It is possible that this situation is 
maintained for a long time but, after a number of years, scientists may be 
able to reach higher values of the variables x and y for which predictions 
no longer hold. Furthermore, the difference between two theories could lie 
not only in the accuracy of their predictions, but it could be the case that 
the ontologies proposed by each of them are completely different.
In this way, we have that it was not by miracle that the predictions 
were fulfilled, but neither was it because the theory corresponding to the 
formula (I) is true or approximately true. The same can be held for our best 
theories and hypotheses, at least those that are expressed by mathematical 
equations.
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§3 - A real case
According to Newtonian mechanics, the inertial mass of a 
material object (“quantity that measures how much acceleration 
the unit-mass-body has when it is interacting with the given object”) 
(Roederer 71), does not depend on the speed of the object. But, according 
to the theory of relativity, the mass of a body depends on the speed of the 
body in relation to a system of reference S, and it satisfies the formula 
[Feynman-Leighton-Sands 15–1]:
m = m
r
 / [ √ (1 – v² / c²)]
where m
r
 is the mass of the body at rest in relation to a system of reference 
S, v is the speed of the body in relation to S, c is the speed of light in 
vacuum (approximately equal to 300,000 km/s). From that equation we 
obtain that m is approximately equal to m
r
, remaining almost constant, if v 
is much slower than c, for example, if v is less than 1% of c.
Then, (A) if the theory of relativity (special and general) is true, we 
should consider Newton’s mechanics false, given that Newton states, for 
example, that space and time are absolute, whereas Einstein considers 
them to be relative. That is, if a metal bar measures 1 m in relation to a 
system of reference S, it could measure 10 cm in relation to another system 
S’, moving in relation to S, according to Einstein (Bunge 14). However, in 
Newtonian mechanics, the bar will measure 1 m in any system of reference. 
Something similar happens to elapsed time in S and S’. For relativistic 
mechanics, the elapsed time depends on the system of reference, and for 
Newtonian mechanics, it does not. There are other differences between the 
two theories: in relativity, space-time is described by Riemannian geometry 
and, by contrast, in Newtonian mechanics, space and time are described by 
means of Euclidean geometry; in Newtonian mechanics, the force of gravity 
acts at a distance, but according to Einstein, gravitational phenomena are 
explained through slopes in space-time produced by massive bodies; etc. 
The two theories cannot both be true at the same time (but they can both 
be false). They are logically incompatible with each other.
Currently, Einstein’s theory is empirically adequate, and Newton’s is 
not. So, how do we explain how Newton’s mechanics had been successful 
for more than two hundred years? Was it by miracle? Was it because it was 
approximately true? Newton’s mechanics cannot be considered nearly true 
if Einstein’s theory is true, given the remarkable differences between the 
two theories. Its success can be explained by the following, which in no way 
appeals to miracles, but is based on facts:
In Newton’s time, all the mobiles traveled at much less than 1% of 
the speed of light (that is, at much less than 3000 km/s). At these speeds, 
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the numerical values provided by the equations of classical mechanics ap-
proximate the numerical values provided by relativity. Thus, the empirical 
data of that time confirmed Newton’s mechanics for many years. This 
was the reason for the Newtonian theory’s predictive success, and not a 
miracle. If the speeds reached in the seventeenth century had been greater, 
the inadequacy of Newton’s theory would have been noticed in that 
century. Newton’s mechanics were perfectly suitable for the data of his 
time and even accurately predicted values for many subsequent years, and 
thus appeared successful. But this does not imply that its success was due 
to a miracle or that it was nearly true.
That is not the only example that can be cited, for this kind of situa-
tions has happened on various occasions throughout scientific history, e.g. 
Wien’s formula for the radiation of a black body versus Planck’s formula, 
(Pérez Izquierdo 56–59). Ancient theories yielded certain numerical 
values that were later confirmed by experimentation, but this does not 
imply in any way that such theories are approximately true. These ancient 
theories have been contrasted under certain experimental conditions (for 
example, at low speeds in the case of Newtonian mechanics) and have been 
confirmed. And for that reason they have been considered successful. But 
when the range of values of the measured variables is extended or when 
new phenomena are discovered, we no longer have any guarantee that 
these theories will pass the experimental tests or that they will be able to 
account for the new empirical data. The truth could be very different.
(B) Let us now consider this other possibility: what would happen if 
the theory of relativity were false? In this case, a theory T not yet formu-
lated could be true, such that the numerical results of T and Newtonian 
mechanics are very similar at low speeds. And, from here, the previous 
analysis is repeated mutatis mutandis.
What could be affirmed is that the numerical values of our theories 
are increasingly closer to the real values . . . but it could happen that the 
ontologies proposed by our theories are completely different from the real 
ontology and, thus, there are no guarantees that our theories are approxi-
mately true or that their theoretical terms refer.
§4 - The argument of non-miracle and the inference
to the best explanation
Another way to present the no miracle argument is by relating it to 
the inference to the best explanation. According to Psillos (1999) “The 
realist claim is that accepting that successful scientific theories describes 
truly (or, near truly) the unobservable world best explain why these theories 
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are empirically successful” (69).4 This author goes on to assert that “NMA5 
intends to conclude that the main theses associated with scientific realism, 
especially the thesis that successful theories are approximately true, offer 
the best explanation of the explanandum”(Psillos 69).
If we consider that one way of presenting the inference to the best 
explanation is the following,6
(P1) q is the best explanation of p
(P2) p
(C) q
We could give a new formulation of the argument of no miracle:
(P1) The approximate truth of the theories T
1
,
T
2
, . . . ,T
n
 is the best explanation that they are 
empirically successful
(P2) T
1
, T
2
, . . . ,T
n
 are empirically successful
(C) T
1
, T
2
, . . . ,T
n
 are approximately
true.
Now, it is clear that the argument I presented in §§ 2 and 3 directly 
attacks (P1) by showing that it is false that the best explanation of the 
success of the theories is that they are approximately true. Indeed, in those 
paragraphs I have given another explanation of the empirical success of 
theories as good as the assumption that they approach the truth. In this 
way, the inference to the best explanation loses its strength by not being 
able to conclude that T
1
, T
2
, . . . ,T
n
 are approximately true.
§5 - Final considerations
I have tried to show that although it is not by miracle that certain 
theories and hypotheses are successful—namely, those expressed through 
equations—it is also not because they approach the truth. The reason for 
their success is due to the fact that for a certain range of its variables, the 
predicted numerical values are similar to the numerical values of the true 
equations. And this situation can be maintained for many years and even 
centuries. But, after a certain period of time, experimental scientists can 
4 Redlined in the original.
5 No miracle argument.
6 See Frost-Arnold, Greg (2010).
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expand the range of values of the equations reached and it can happen that 
the theories and hypotheses in question are no longer confirmed.
One could continue insisting with the approach to the truth affirming 
that the old theories are a limit case of the new ones. Those arguing in 
this manner forget that a theory is much more than the numerical value 
provided by its equations because it involves a whole ontology proposal and 
new theories, usually, not only differ in the values of the equations but also 
in that ontology. It is enough to think about the great ontological differ-
ence between, for example, Ptolemaic and Keplerian astronomy or between 
Newton’s physics and Einstein’s.
I think I have shown that scientific realists have lost their best 
argument, that of the no miracle, in their attempt to show that our best 
theories are approximately true and that their theoretical terms refer. It 
only remains to embrace a healthy skeptical position with respect to the 
thesis of realism.
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